From Pamphlet to Utopian Caliphate:
Utilization of Mass Media and Promotion of the Caliphate Ideology among Muslim Youth in Solo

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Abstract

The ideology of the caliphate is being intensely discussed in the Indonesian Muslim community, following the appearance of the Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) *convoy that invites to welcome the emergence of the caliphate. This study focuses on examining the response of Muslim youth in Solo to the ideas of the caliphate, which are widely mushrooming in the mass media, especially in the Kaffah bulletin, one of the bulletins that disseminate the caliphate ideology on various platforms. This research uses the descriptive qualitative method, which provides descriptive data from the analysis results on the Kaffah in as many as 256 editions. The data collection technique used in this research is critical content analysis, interview, focus group discussion, and documentation. This paper argues that Kaffah has successfully promoted and mobilized young people to be attracted to the idea of the caliphate because they could neatly package religious doctrines with the hot issues being discussed. However, in brainwashing the public through the pamphlet, Kaffah is frequently questionable, quoting* dhaif *hadiths, distorting opinions, and utilizing fake news to support statements propagated by their affiliates.*

Keywords: propaganda, caliphate ideology, Kaffah Bulletin, and Muslim youth

Introduction

Recently, the author got a message from one of the WhatsApp groups, which firmly concluded against the actions taken by Indians against the prohibition of Muslim women from wearing hijabs at universities. At that time, India's Hindu Nationalist Party (BJP) was aggressively banning the use of religious attributes in academia. But what surprised us was the content at the end of the message. According to its affiliation, there was the oppression of minority Muslims in various parts of the world because they did not implement the Islamic caliphate system. It made us curious; eventually, we could track the writings that they had spread through various social media such as Websites, Facebook, Instagram, and a private Telegram group. Namely, the Dakwah Kaffah bulletin, which has been distributed through mosques in multiple regions, although it has not been distributed evenly throughout Indonesia.[1] Based on the research, there are at least 10 areas where the bulletin was distributed, including Jakarta, Pandeglang, Bogor, Bandung, Bukittinggi, Sukaharja, Surabaya, Gresik, Kediri, Yogyakarta, and Solo (Akbar, 2019; Amrulloh, 2018; Hanifuddin, 2019). When this bulletin was still called *al-Islam*, these pamphlets were found and spread in various areas, especially in Solo; propaganda through these writings was also the starting

1 Interview with Yusuf a former HTI, Surakarta, May 2022. All names of the interviewees in this paper are pseudonyms.

point for introducing someone to be trapped in radicalism and even terrorism.[2]

Kaffah Bulletin is an Islamic writing owned, distributed, and disseminated by former Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Ghazali, 2021; Setia, 2021b). Until this research was conducted, at least they had released 256 editions which were distributed every Friday. HTI is an Islamic organization (*ormas*) that has been officially banned through lieu of law (*perppu*) No. 2/2017 because they are considered an extreme and radical movement that wants to establish a caliphate state, which is contrary to the ideology of Pancasila and the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Burhani, 2017; Zaim, 2019). Although this movement is non-violent and rejects terrorism, their exclusive, conservative, *takfiri* (a Muslim who declares another Muslim to be apostate), anti-pluralism, and anti-tolerance attitudes are susceptible to being involved in committing acts of violence (Romario, 2019; Setia, 2021b, 2021a; Syah & Setia, 2021; Ward, 2009). Indeed, official legal revocation by the government can be interpreted as a sign of the end of their offline da'wah. In contrast, they succeeded in making social media a new medium to campaign for their ideology after the movement was officially disbanded. In other words, the end of an organization does not necessarily mean the end of promoting religious ideas (Rumman & Hanyia, 2021).

Islamist hardliner groups or Islamism[3] is not a new phenomenon in the history of the development of Islam. After the end of the last Ottoman caliphate (1924), followed by imperialistic and colonization by the West, in addition to various problems faced by Muslims in the political, economic, social, and religious fields, the Islamic world began to talk about reviving an Islamic state (*Khilafah*) (Fauzan & Fata, 2018). In the Indonesian context, the ideas of establishing an Islamic state or implementing Islamic law (Sharia) to replace state laws were echoed by

various groups, such as *Laskar Jihad* (the Jihad Paramilitary Force), Salafi (Yuwanamu 2016), *Laskar Pembela Islam* (the Paramilitary Force of the Defender of Islam) (Hasan, 2002), *Majelis Mujahdin Indonesia* (the Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly, MMI) (Qomaruzzaman, 2013), *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Darul Islam/Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia, DI/TII) (Miftakhur Ridlo, 2019; Mubarak, 2015), *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (the Congregation of Defender of Monotheism, JAT) (Abdullah, 2018), *Jamaah Islamiyyah* (the Islamic Congregation, JI) (Wardana, 2017), *Front Pembela Islam* (the Front of Defender of Islam, FPI), (Syaefudin, 2014), *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (the Liberation Party of Indonesia, HTI) (Hilmy 2014; Qohar 2017; Fitriyana 2019; Ward 2009), *Forum Umat Islam* (the Islamic Umma Forum, FUI) (Suhanah, 2013), *Khilafatul Muslimin* (the Caliphate of Muslims, KM) and others. It should be noted, however, these movements do not have a uniform understanding of the concept of the nation-state such as supporting democracy, using violence-approach, implementing Islamic law, and so forth (Munabari et al., 2020).

The ideas of the caliphate they propagate are increasingly spreading, especially on social media. The rapid development of the internet can be used by various Islamic revivalist movements to mobilize and join the group or at least accept the ideas or doctrines they embrace. Studies on the relationship between religion, -particularly Islamist groups, -and the internet have become frequent because of the massive use of social media. There are previous studies examine the relationship between radical groups and the role of the mass media, such as the role of the internet in facilitating the radicalization process (Mølmen and Ravndal 2021); proficient use of social media as a propaganda medium to spread HTI ideology (Hew, 2018); the utilization cyberactivism by Islamist movement to mobilize users in supporting their activities (Ahyar, 2017); utilization of Facebook, Instagram, and Telegram account for online recruitment by extremists groups in Indonesia (Sidney, 2021); use of multiple platforms to democratize the appeal of jihad as well as recruitment and planning tools by

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2 Interview with Joko a former terrorist, Surakarta July 2022

3 The term Islamism refers to the affiliation of Muslims who want to make Islam not only a religion (values, morals, behavior) but also a system consisting of various dimensions including politics (Ahyar 2017)

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Walther & McCoy, 2021).

This article aims to analyze the content of the Kaffah bulletin and investigate the response of Muslim youths in Solo. This paper examines what ideas they spread, how they utilize the development of social media to spread their ideas, and how they package religious message narratives to attract readers. To what extent does Muslim youth accept the concept of the caliphate? We used a qualitative method to fill this purpose and conducted in-depth interviews and FGD with Muslim youth readers of the Kaffah bulletin content. In this paper, the authors argue that the emergence of various extremist movements, -either individually or in groups, -who want to implement Sharia or change the ideology of the nation-state to become a caliphate (Islamic state) is not surprising because there are still many contents or accounts spreading the ideology either in the public sphere or cybersphere (digital). In order to go against radical content, it is insufficient to counter it through the dissemination of moderate scope or the removal of content that is suspected of spreading extremism and radicalism. They are relatively easy to rebuild these communication channels (Lakomy, 2022). Therefore, the efforts of the Indonesian government to strengthen integration between communities (mainly Muslim youths) and high network involvement both offline and online are immensely needed.

Research Method

This paper employs qualitative research that provides descriptive data from the analysis results on the Kaffah in as many as 256 editions. The data collection technique used in this research is critical content analysis, interview, focus group discussion (FGD), and documentation. In the context of Solo, this city became a fertile ground for radical Islamic youth groups such as *Laskar Hizbullah*, *Laskar Hamas*, *Forum Pemuda Islam Surakarta* (the Front of Islamic Youth of Surakarta, FPIS), *Forum Umat Islam Surakarta* (the Forum of Islamic Community of Surakarta, FUIS), and others (Baidhawy, 2018). Therefore, Solo is known as a place where various Islamic

radical groups have flourished (Wildan, 2018).

Results and Discussion
Promoting Caliphate Ideology on New Media

As a multicultural country, Indonesia certainly faces many ethnic, social, cultural, and religious diversity challenges. The community is expected to have multicultural awareness to avoid no clashes between groups, so an open-minded and tolerant religious understanding is needed to create peace in a diverse society. Indonesia has been agreed upon as a democratic country -not an Islamic state-but various Islamic organizations have made many efforts to turn it into an Islamic state (Hasyim, 2022). Islamic organizations could use the momentum of the fall of the New Order regime to demonstrate their existence and spread their ideas (Munabari et al., 2020). Freedom of expression and opinion is expected to realize a just democracy. Still, transnational ideas that are not appropriate to the nation's ideology are also easily found in Indonesia, one of which is the discourse on the caliphate (establishment of an Islamic state). To make it easier to mobilize supporters, the proponents of the idea began to use various tools to facilitate the propaganda process, one of which was through social media.

New media and online networks as a means of mass communication are very strategic because they can be anonymous and have a broad reach. Therefore, it is unsurprising that social media is the leading choice for radical groups to disseminate their understanding. In addition, Indonesia is one of the most active social media users globally (Von et al., 2013), so it can increase the opportunity for radical ideas to spread through online platforms. In turn, mass media has contributed to spreading diverse interpretations of Islam, including exclusive, radical, conservative, and extreme understandings of Islam (Nisa, 2018).

In 2016, the number of internet users in Indonesia reached 132.7 million people. Seeing the potential of the Indonesians actively using social media, radical Islamic groups can take advantage of this opportunity to participate in what they call da'wah activities through mass media. They actively disseminate content

in the public sphere (through pamphlets, articles, and bulletins) and in the cybersphere (through various social media platforms). The success of ISIS in 2014 in utilizing multiple social media features to recruit and indoctrinate new members was followed by other radical Islamic groups spreading their ideas. They do not hesitate to attract many followers and gain sympathy through various mass media (Sari, 2017; Walther & McCoy, 2021).

The presence of new media that can disseminate information quickly and instantly is widely used for various purposes, one of which is the motive of da'wah (religion). But unfortunately, the multiple features displayed by the new media have a negative impact, namely the freedom to convey information or religious messages offered. Inevitably, ideas spread across various platforms, sometimes conflicting with the official ideology of a country. In the Indonesian context, the government has officially recognized Pancasila as the central ideology of the nation-state, but many radical Islamic groups are campaigning to change this ideology into the caliphate doctrine (Mundir, 2016; Gunawan, 2022).

The dissemination of the ideology of the Islamic caliphate in Indonesia is articulated through various media and is still mushrooming on diverse social media. Even though the doctrine contradicts the official ideology, one of the platforms still active in voicing the caliphate is Kaffah. At first, Kaffah was merely a physical pamphlet published periodically every Friday but due to the rapid development of technology, they also spread ideas through social media. Various Kaffah Da'wah accounts have gained thousands of followers; Telegram has reached 13.6 subscribers, and Facebook and Instagram accounts have reached more than 30 thousand followers. Interestingly enough, in Telegram, Kaffah does not merely spread their ideas through text but also in the form of audio podcast recordings. They are relatively active in uploading their new posts every Friday via telegram, which has been downloaded and read by thousands of loyal readers.

Telegram is an application that lately received special attention from the Indonesian government. This is mainly because the application contains elements of radical content, paving the way for terrorist crimes (Uemenina, 2018). However, one of the telegram features is the provision of end-to-end encryption services, which allow the inclusive dissemination of information to be used by certain groups. This ultimately forced the government to take decisive action in July 2017 to temporarily block the telegram application service (Nuraniyah, 2018). After a mediation process between the CEO of Telegram and the Ministry of Information, it was finally agreed that Telegram must follow the applicable Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to operate in Indonesia. Eliminating telegram content affiliated with terrorists is a wise step for the government to overcome the communication link of radical Islamic groups. However, the ease of creating new groups or forums still needs to be questioned so that their ideas still run rampant in new media.

Caliphate's Propaganda on Kaffah Bulletin

Kaffah first published pamphlets (articles) on August 11, 2017, after the government revoked the legal entity for the activities of the Islamic organization of HTI in the same year. The revocation of the legal law made them change the name of the Al-Islam bulletin to Kaffah. The reason for choosing the name is that their struggle (HTI) has reached the *tafa'ul* phase (interaction with the community), so the spread of Kaffah Islam (as a whole) must still be disseminated openly (Akbar, 2019; Setia, 2021b). The words *khilafah*,[4] *syariat Islam*, and *kaffah* were widely used in this bulletin to promote their ideas and mobilize the readers to follow what they propagated. This bulletin is consistent in terms of the method of writing, which is 4 pages in each edition (double-sided sheet of paper), starting with verse 208 of al-Baqarah in letterhead (O who believe! enter into Islam whole-heartedly) and ending with the sentence '*simpan baik-baik lembaran ini, di dalamnya ada ayat-ayat al-Qur'an*' (keep this paper carefully, in which there are the verses of the al-Qur'an).

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4 Only in 1-100th edition, the word *khilafah* is written 181 times

Therefore, the Kaffah bulletin is a renamed version of the previous Al-Islam bulletin (Ghazali 2021). Although its circulation is more limited, it has the same pattern, which is published every Friday with the target of mosques, colleges, public schools, and the broader community through social media. It also has a common theme, content, and diction that criticizes the system of government, ideology, and resource management that are considered un-Islamic, so they offer an alternative to the caliphate system to overcome various problems. The owners of Kaffah do not mention which organizations they are affiliated with in their writings. Still, based on the data collected and research of the various contents of the ideas, it can be ascertained that the Kaffah authority holders are the former Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia members. This movement carries the ideology of the caliphate as a state system and rejects democracy, Pancasila, and anti-Western (Rijal, 2010; Romario, 2019) these ideas can be easily found in his various writings (see Figure 1).

Other evidence toward the argument that former HTI-operated Kaffah can be found on Instagram; some of those who followed Kaffah's account were prominent figures who had positions in HTI before it was dissolved, such as Rokhmat Labib (former chairman of HTI), Ismail Yusanto (former spokesman of HTI), and Felix Siauw (former prominent preacher of HTI). Ismail once responded about the disbandment of HTI where; he claimed that HTI was not a prohibited organization. Instead, HTI was an Islamic organization that did not have a legal entity (legality); after all, da'wah is God's commandment because HTI never backs down (Romario, 2019). Kaffah's content has also responded on several occasions regarding discrimination against HTI (see Figure 2) as follows:

> Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has long been persecuted, intimidated, and discriminated against. At its peak, HTI was 'killed' by revoking its association legal entity (BHP) status. However, the regime in this country from the beginning guessed wrong. The 'soul'

of Hizbut Tahrir does not lie in its BHP (legal status law) but in its ideology. Islam's ideology (*mabda'*) always lives in every heart of its activists. At the same time trying to be revived and disseminated in the heart of every Muslim. Not only in Indonesia but throughout the world (68th edition, p. 1).

In narrating their primary goal, which is the establishment of a *khilafah 'ala minhaj an-nubuwwah*, Kaffah was able to package religious messages by combining various topics, such as political, religious, social, and economic interests. For example, in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, Kaffah keeps making provocative narratives. In the 135th edition, under the title '*Wabah Corona, Dimana Peran Negara?*' (COVID Epidemic, Where is the Role of the State?, they argued that the pandemic has made the people more aware that we need pious Muslim leaders. Furthermore, it is time for the Muslims to return to the Islamic system by implementing Islamic Sharia as a whole in the *khilafah 'ala minhaj al-nubuwwah* (p. 3-4). In another article (137th edition), they pray that Allah will soon relieve the COVID-19 pandemic from the Muslim country, at the same time eliminate the unjust leaders, and hope to replace them with just caliphs and implement Islamic law (p. 4).

Political issues become the most widely discussed topic compared to other issues, considering that HTI is very active in political contestation. There are some provocative themes that have been spread in various mass media (see table).

Topics in the contents of the Kaffah bulletin

In addition to responding to Indonesia's issues, they also react to problems in various

parts of the world, such as the genocide against Ghouta Muslims in Syria (30th edition), ethnic Chinese Muslims in Uighurs (70th edition), Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar (80th edition), shooting of Muslims in New Zealand (83rd edition), discrimination against Indian Muslims (131st and 232nd editions), defense of black ethnicity Muslim in America (145th edition), threats against insults to the Prophet in France (166th edition) and defense of Muslims in Palestine (193rd edition).

Kaffah can be said to be able to build caliphate narratives by taking advantage of the problems that occur in Indonesia and throughout the world. They can make the public to be interested in the religious messages they published. By utilizing technological advances, especially in social media, religious doctrines can be disseminated freely, shifting the traditional authority of religion to a new Islamic authority (Iqbal 2014). One of the doctrines Kaffah has voiced most vigorously in its various contents is upholding the Islamic caliphate as a solution to the multidimensional critique Muslims face worldwide. However, in delivering the primary doctrine, they are often dishonest in writing, skeptical, enforcing opinions, and using other strategies to smooth their propaganda.

Visual Persuasion

In promoting their main agenda (establishing an Islamic state), the Kaffah bulletin would describe the current hot issues and end theme-based with persuasive sentences to the readers/audiences. Therefore, visual persuasion is very easy to find in Kaffah's content at the end of each paragraph; they articulate the caliphate discourse by combining it with other topics. First, political interests; they said that the caliphate plays an essential role in the Nusantara; there are indeed many traces of the caliphate in this country so that we can feel the pleasures of Islam (154th edition, p.4). Second, economic interest particularly, the increase in various basic needs due to scarcity in the state, can be used to package the propaganda; they say Islam is the right solution in managing the availability of basic needs. This problematic condition is caused by the implementation of n a capitalist

system; without the implementation of Islamic Sharia, this situation will continue to occur (236th edition, p. 4).

Third, social interests. The disaster that occurred in Indonesia, according to them, is expected to increase obedience and raise awareness, including the understanding of leaving the artificial system (*ideologi buatan manusia*), and then replacing it with the correct system, namely Islamic Sharia (054th edition, p.4). Fourth, religious interests. They said that the *ulamas* have agreed appointing a caliphate is obligatory according to the Sharia. This means carrying out this obligation gets a reward and neglecting it will get a sin. Striving to realize the caliphate is an essential part of obeying Allah.

Distortion of Argument

Kaffah emphasizes religious aspects such as using various verses and hadiths in spreading the caliphate ideology. One of the hadiths often quoted by Kaffah is the hadith from Ahmad about the return of the caliphate, which follows the prophetic method (30, 44, 70, 77, 121, 131, 161 editions), even though the narration of the hadith is weak and there is an error in the hadith narration (*sanad*) (Herdiansah, 2019; Yusron, 2019). In addition, they also quote various news from the website to update the current hot issues during the week. But sometimes, they sort out the opinion or argument, so it seems they are forcing opinions to strengthen their primary goals. In the 247th edition, the HTI cheery-picked MUI's statement to support further their goal, which said that the caliphate and jihad are part of Islam, even though MUI argues that the caliphate is not the only model or system of the state and jihad is not merely a war. They either intentionally or unintentionally deduct the news to promote their ideas.

In addition, Kaffah quoted hoax news that seem to support their opinion. For instance, in the 60th edition, they posted the existence of an LGBT group containing thousands of Garut Junior High School students, even though two days before the bulletin was released, the local police had confirmed that the Gay student group at the School of Garut was fake news. However, it is unfortunate

that they do not hesitate to publish and print a bulletin in that edition and even continue to disseminate their ideas to the general public. In the process of facilitating propaganda, they are 'forced' to distort opinions, which is very dangerous for the readers. The case of the alleged existence of thousands of LGBT in Garut was successfully packaged by them as if the Indonesian government allowed or failed to take care of the LGBT group. Unsuspected readers would be easily provoked when reading the topic of the writing. Eventually, they would lead to hatred or anti-government. From this case, we can see that if the themes that Kaffah is disseminating are issues related to the caliphate, there will be many supporters of those ideas. In turn, their writings can convince the readers -mainly Muslim youth- and support whatever is contained in the Kaffah bulletin.

Muslim Youths Response to the Caliphate Ideology

According to observers, young people belong to the revolutionary class who can take the sympathy of the proletariat as the primary agent of social and political change in an area, so the role of youth in maintaining the harmonization of the state should not be underestimated (Bayat, 2010). The involvement of Muslim youth in radical groups is still growing in Indonesia, so youth radicalization is a prominent topic among researchers. When discussing radicalism, the city of Solo cannot be abandoned. Since the late 20th and early 21st century, Solo has become a place where various Islamic radical groups have flourished (Wildan, 2013). A survey from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) states that many young people still adhere to radical ideas such as the establishment of a caliphate or the application of Islamic Sharia. Another survey that is no less surprising comes from the Alvara Research Center, which shows that there are hundreds of young people who support Indonesia becoming an Islamic state under the banner of the caliphate (Fautanu, 2022).

The responses of Muslim youths in Solo regarding the issue of the caliphate were incredibly diverse; many of them entirely supported the enforcement of the caliphate and Islamic law. Some argued that there was no problem with the system in Indonesia, as long as the Islamic Sharia could be enforced either through democracy or the caliphate. Whereas others who accept the democratic system and reject the caliphate are worried that it is unfair to non-Muslims, given the pluralistic society, and is not appropriate if applied in Indonesia. However, this study focuses on Muslim youth in Solo who support or expect the caliphate system to be enforced in Indonesia (FGD with 8 Muslim Youth in Solo, August 2022).

During our interview with Muslim Youths in Solo, we asked them to give their opinions on the 247th edition of the Kaffah bulletin. The edition is entitled '*jangan kriminalisasi ajaran Islam*' (don't criminalize Islamic teachings), which was a response to the arrest of the leadership of the Khilafatul Muslimin (KM) as a form of criminalization of those who call for the instructions of the caliphate. In this edition, it is explained that:

The caliphate is an obligation in Islam as *salat*, fasting, *zakat*, pilgrimage, etc. The caliphate is also one of the most important Sunnah of the Prophet and the Sunnah of the Companions, adhering to this teaching by defending, protecting, and re-establishing it in its absence. Because the *ulamas* have agreed on the obligation to appoint the caliph, we should become Muslims who glorify Islam, its Sharia, and its teachings. Moreover, upholding the caliphate is an obligation for us (247th edition, p. 3-4).

Nisa stated that it is obligatory to apply the Islamic law as a Muslim. Anyone who hates, insults, and blasphemes against the Islamic law can be considered an infidel (*kafir*). Caliphate and jihad are part of Islamic law (*syariat*); even Islam demands to carry out jihad and establish a caliphate based on the Qur'an and Sunnah so that if someone insults these two Sharia (caliphate and jihad), they are considered infidels (Interview with Nisa, June 2022). While Joni argued that in Islam, the concept of the caliphate is not a sensitive or sacred matter. For him, the most important thing is the essence and purpose of the idea of the caliphate, which is to ensure

the continuity of religion and the benefit of the people. He was very concerned because most of the Indonesians misunderstand the concept of the caliphate (Interview with Joni, June 2022). Rahmad stated that the existence of the caliphate is fundamental as a place for protection because, at this time, many Islamic countries are being attacked and need a place for refuge. Furthermore, he believes that with the existence of a caliphate, all problems can be resolved quickly (Interview with Rahmad, August 2022).

However, their expectations regarding the enforcement of the caliphate in Indonesia are wishful thinking; they do not know how to implement the caliphate enforcement, even if there is disruption due to the implementation of the system by replacing the system that has been negotiated upon by the Indonesian people (democracy), the most important for them is the establishment of the caliphate. Because according to them, the chaos that occurred in Indonesia was caused by not implementing the caliphate system; if the 'Islamic' system could be enforced, then Indonesia would become a safe, prosperous, and blessed country (*baldatun thayyibatun wa Rabbun ghafur*) (Interview with Fatimah, June 2022).

Seemingly, the narrations presented by Kaffah seem to be able to 'hypnotize' readers, especially young people so that they would be interested in the ideas conveyed. Because they still have doubts about their identity, these Muslim youths want to change the system to become a caliphate, and at the same time, they are also confused about how to implement this ideology. Seeing the dozens of acceptances among Muslim youth regarding the caliphate ideology that was spread through Kaffah, the authors think the government needs to take decisive action to stem the flow of radical thoughts; stakeholders and the public also need to counter-narrative by spreading moderate views, so that the readings presented on social media do not merely contain radical understandings.

Conclusion

Kaffah is a collection of writings affiliated with HTI; it is a transformation of the Al-Islam bulletin. Even though the government has successfully blocked HTI as a legitimate Islamic organization, it does not mean the ideology they embrace can also be stopped. The ease of accessing social media has been utilized by ex-HTI to mobilize readers and users so that Kaffah, initially in the form of a bulletin (printed form), is also published in digital format. It is not sure how many thousands of copies they have distributed throughout Indonesia. Yet, it is clear that the spread of the caliphate ideology is widely mushrooming on various social media platforms. On Facebook, after Kaffah uploaded the newest article, 249th edition, with the title, 'Nabi Muhammad SAW. kembali dinistakan, umat tak boleh diam!' (Prophet Muhammad PBUH was again insulted, ummah should not be silent), it only took 10 hours, and the number of people who shared the post reached 2.3 thousand users and thousands of others who liked the article. Thus, the emergence of branches or other groups propagating the establishment of a caliphate should not be surprising because people are still straightforward to find content or narratives that campaign for the idea of a caliphate in the public sphere or cyber sphere.

Kaffah's writings show that they understand religion literally, often campaigning for the golden past of the Islamic world as a solution to today's Muslim problems. Their goal is to persuade Islamic law to be implemented as a whole (kaffah) under the banner of the caliphate. Various issues occur in the Islamic world, such as problems of economic inequality, divisions between Muslims, and discrimination against Muslims, considered a punishment or consequence of -what they call- kufr (infidelity) ideologies, i.e., nationalism, socialism, capitalism, democracy, secularism, liberalism, pluralism, and all products of Western thought. If Muslims want a prosperous life, they must reapply Allah's rules, and what must be done is none other than re-establishing the Islamic caliphate. This is the life that Kaffah dreams of and aspires to Muslims.

Through writing, it can be said that Kaffah succeeded in agitating the readers. The ideas or dreams they echoed seem to have attracted

some Muslim youths' interest in the Solo. The number of cases in the government is also one of the consequences of young people preferring the 'instant solution' offered by radical movements that replace the nation-state government system with an Islamic state. It is not surprising that various groups of Muslims widely support this alternative solution. Therefore, cooperation between the government, stakeholders, and the community in forming a just strengthening of the state will help Muslim youth believe that the current government system can make Indonesia more advanced and prosperous.

Acknowledgments

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Unattributed Interviews

Fatimah (pseudonym), interviewed on 17 June 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

FGD with 8 young people, Raka, Tri, Setyo, Putri, Intan, Nur, Siti, Jannah (pseudonym), interviewed on 11 August 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

Joko (pseudonym), interviewed on 11 July 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

Joni (pseudonym), interviewed on 26 June 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

Nisa (pseudonym), interviewed on 25 June 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

Rahmad (pseudonym), interviewed on 18 August 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

Yusuf (pseudonym), interviewed on 23 May 2022, Surakarta, Indonesia.

NO	TOPIC	TOTAL	Provocative Contents (edition)
1	Political	112	Prohibition of supporting unjust leaders (012); Ummah, unity, and politics (018); Nusantara owes to the caliphate (154); Allah's party vs Satan's party (037); the dangers of communism and capitalism (058); democracy deceives the people (229); the relationship between *Khilafah* & Nusantara (148); Religious moderation, from Pluralism to Christmas together (213).
2	Economic	11	Islamic way to resolve poverty (049 & 236); *Taqwa*, keeping away the narrowness of life (046); Dinar & Dirham, Islamic Sharia-compliant currency (180).
3	Social	31	LGBT invites virus (025); Health services, people's rights, not official marketing (218); Be careful with hoaxes (023); be aware of the spread of the Coronavirus (127).
4	Religious	102	Caliphate is Islamic teachings (022); establishing a caliphate, a form of obedience to Allah (032); *hijrah* to the *Jahiliyah* system (056), the suffering of the world without a caliphate (181); The responsibility of the ummah to uphold the caliphate (182); 101 years of suffering for the people without a caliphate (233); Independent from human law (206); Sharia needs to be applied, not recontextualised (217)

Table 1: Such Provocative Contents of the Kaffah Bulletin

Figure 1: the Ideology of Kaffah

Figure 2: Defending HTI