

Social Conflict Resolution Among Islamic Ideologies in Puger, Jember, East Java

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Abstract

This research is developed on the basis of analytical construction focusing on two ideologies in Islam, namely Sunni, and Shi'ite. These two mainstreams of school of thoughts often create social conflict in the region of Puger. This research attempts to offer practical solutions. To explore deep understanding, a phenomenological approach involves eight participants, consisting of religious leaders, government officials, and community leaders. An in-depth interviews is used for the main data collection, such as the interview protocol instrument. All data are analyzed by data reduction theory, starting with identifying, determining, and narrating. This study has found that there are some factors trigger the conflict between two groups in the region of Puger including religious sect differences, rivalry existence in pesantren (Islamic boarding school), provocateurs, and allegations of discrimination against particular ideologies. Additionally, this study also affirms that there are other ideologies involved in this conflict. This study suggests intensive communication among the communities in the region of Puger, Jember, East Java, could potentially reduce the issues.

Keywords: Islamic ideologies, social conflict, resolution, rivalry

Introduction

Social conflict study has its own specialty to discuss and explore, particularly in societies that transform every day in this modern age. These transformations have some dynamics and frictions that can create conflicts, whether it is between communities and society (horizontally) or governments (vertically). Indonesia is included in this phenomenon. Indonesia is known as a diverse country that consists of various ethnicities, religions, cultures, understandings, ideologies, and communities (Malihah et al., 2015). Indonesian law puts the importance on Human Rights as a concept that underlies a rule of law. The 1945 Constitution has made human rights values in the preamble

and its articles, namely article number 27 to article number 31. Article number 27 section (1), explains that "all citizens have an equal position in the republic and government, and it is a must to uphold law and government without exception." Based on the 1945 Constitution (article number 27, section (1) that a place like Indonesia has no legal discrimination against its citizens (Sumner, 2015).

Additionally, Indonesia has Human Rights Laws, specifically, number 39 (1999) which concern the issue of freedom and religious harmony as regulated in articles 22 and 70. Article 22 states that everyone has the right to have the freedom to embrace specific religion and worship it according to their religions and

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beliefs and that the state guarantees freedom for everyone to embrace and practice their religions and worshipping according to their religions and beliefs. It is written in article number 70 that to apply their rights and their obligations, everyone must follow restrictions solely to get respect for their rights and other people's freedoms, do justice, pay attention to moral considerations, security, and public order in a social-democratic of Indonesia.

All the regulations and the laws that have been described above indicate that Indonesia does not support conflict or even violence. However, the social conflict in Indonesia that has occurred since 1990 shows a quite high escalation. Some social conflict factors are; first, conflicts between community groups; second, inter-ethnic or inter-and intra-religious conflicts; third, the conflict between the community and the government with the background of certain cases. Religion can be one of the factors why social conflicts often occur around us, such as religious ideologies, whether it is internal conflicts or external conflicts (Walfield et al., 2017). Although the social conflict that occurs is not referred to as the religious conflict, because the conflict was not carried out based on religious nuances. However, this does not mean that religious elements do not contribute at all to these conflicts.

In recent years, Indonesia has become one of the world's most productive regions in producing tragic stories surrounding violence. During the 1st year after the reformation, there were at least 2,398 cases of violence and discrimination occurred in Indonesia. The Denny JA Foundation noted that 65 percent of the violence occurred because of a religious background/ religious understanding. The rest, respectively, are ethnic violence (20%), gender violence (15%), and sexual orientation violence (5%) (Roberto & Hoyt, 2021). A phenomenon that is very contradictory to the unique traditions of the Indonesian people, is cooperation, harmonious deliberation, and help (Ma'arif, 2019). Referring to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as ratified (becoming the Indonesian national law) through the Law No. 12 of 2005, ideally, the state must

protect the civil and political rights of its citizens, especially the basic rights and freedoms such as the right to life, the right not to be tortured and the right to justice. However in reality, instead of being protected, what happens is violence and violates the civil and political freedom of citizens (Chaney, 2020).

In nearly 19 years, incidents of violence related to religious conflict in Indonesia have caused the death toll of more than 55,000 people. Among them, 761 people were victims of death, 1873 people were injured and 52,446 people were victims of missing and displaced. In terms of property, violence related to religious issues in Indonesia has damaged 1,330 houses, 70 houses of worship, and 593 other buildings, bringing the total to 1,993 buildings. The number of losses to these assets does not include the types of motorized vehicles, both two-wheeled and four-wheeled, as well as various losses that are not reported by the media that is the source of this study (Marwiyah, 2020).

As for the records, the highest religious freedom violations case or belief in Indonesia during 2011 was the prohibition or restriction of religious activities or religious activities of certain groups with 49 cases, or 48%, then acts of intimidation and threats of violence by state officials in 20 cases or 20%, the omission of violence in 11 cases (11%), violence and coercion of belief in 9 cases (9%), sealing and banning of houses of worship 9 cases (9%), and criminalization or victimization of belief in 4 cases (4%). Based on this data, it can be understood that during 2011, there had been an increase in violations of freedom of religion and belief in various regions in Indonesia. In the previous year 2011, there were only 64 cases, this number increased by 18% to 92 cases (Asnawan, 2018).

Conflict with religious nuances, on the stage of history, has been shown since the first time in the events of Cain and Abel. This conflict should not be a religious conflict but to the historians associated with religion, the conflict that led to the killing was shown by Islam. Whereas the conflict between Cain was a small-scale social conflict, namely because Cain rejected his father's orders because Cain wanted to marry

his sister (Almirzanah, 2010). The story of Abel and Cain is the source of our philosophy, as Adam is the source of our philosophy in the history of humans. The battle between Cain and Abel is a battle between two opposing camps that lasted throughout history, in historical dialectics. Isn't the story of the prophets also inseparable from violent discourse? (Mackintosh-Smith, 2019). The Prophet Yusuf, for example, was written to have faced and become the victim of violent plans by his siblings. Prophet Jesus, who was stalked by death threats, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, was even later believed to have been a victim of violence. Prophet Muhammad had entered *'aamul huzn* (a sad time) because he lost someone who could provide a security sense, while he still had to face the resistance of his uncles, boycotts, terror, and even being chased by the Quraysh tribe who wanted to kill him (Rizvi, 1999). Conflict within the Muslim community in Indonesia is perhaps just a disgrace that must be covered up when it occurs for a moment the reason that there are not many victims. However, when the incident has sacrificed the joints of togetherness and brotherhood, it is necessary to make a lesson. These situations happened because there are several causes such as business competition, inheritance struggles, and intolerance of the religious leaders and religions. Racism towards other religions can create internal vulnerability. (Syed & Ali, 2021).

There is one interesting point that needs to be underlined. Whereas in Indonesia, Islam is the majority religion. According to Abul A'la Al Maududi, as quoted by Afif Muhammad, a professor from UIN Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung, the majority, of the pressure on minorities almost entirely occurs in countries where the majority of the people are not Muslim. Meanwhile, in countries where the majority of citizens are Muslim, oppression occurs rarely. Even some Muslim scholars say that, in contrast to Islam, non-Islamic religions, especially Catholicism and Christianity, do not have teachings about tolerance (Islam, 2020). In 2003, the Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic Thought Conference (MPI-NU) which was held in Situbondo, produced something in line with

Afif's statement, namely, trying to see Islamic doctrines not only from the law perspective, but also from social ethics that can be accepted by all people, regardless of religion, ethnicity, and race. Islam is not only limited by and to the people (*rahmatan li al-Alamin*). Islam as social ethics is a way to strengthen the spirit of nationality (Karamatilloevich et al., 2020).

Abul A'la Al Maududi's statement is not wrong, but not completely true. Islam in Indonesia is the majority religion, we know that the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim (88%), and the rest are Protestant (6%), Catholic (3%), Hindu (2%), Buddhist, Confucian, and others (1%) (Purwanto, 2017). However, Islam is rarely absent in contributing to the record of conflict in the form of violence/ oppression. For example in Manado, North Maluku in 2000, or what is known as the 171 riots because it occurred on the 17th of the 1st month (January), at that time there were 76.47% Muslims, 17.55% Hindus, 2.5% Christians, and Buddhists 2% (Gerring & Apfeld, 2018).

Even worse, Muslims destroy each other against their fellow Muslims. The violent conflict against Ahmadiyah followers in Cikeusik on February 6, 2011, and also the Ahmadiyah conflict in Transito Mataram (Koerner & Putro, 2017), even in the last few months' inter-Muslim violence also occurred in Sampang-Madura in 2012, namely violence against Shiah followers (Mustaqilla, 2017). And this was followed by a conflict that was not much different, namely a conflict involving the issue of Shiah and Sunni in Puger Sub-district, Jember Regency, which resulted in death. However, quite encouraging developments emerged later with more serious efforts, both from government and community initiatives to strengthen peacebuilding by rebuilding people's lives in conflict areas (Miklian & Medina Bickel, 2020). Thus, it is not too wrong to say that the recent tensions show how unruly harmony between fellow Muslims who interact with each other in social life. This shows how fragile the relationships in the religious sphere, especially in Islam, are what we have been proud of. This study aims to answer the question of how violence in the region can happen. The study

area is located in East Java, which is densely populated with diverse community characteristics and has a strong religious level. The conflicts that will be explored are those that happen in the Puger region. This social conflict in Puger sub-district has not only occurred once but has taken place several times, for example in June 2012 with a recitation motive which resulted in the injury of several residents, continued in the following year, namely 2013 in September which was packed with a carnival and culminated in the victim of someone's life (Solano, 2018). According to KH Hasyim Muzadi, the former chairman of the PBNU, the conflict could be like a time bomb that could explode again at any time, so he asked that the conflict in Puger can be resolved to its roots (Trimbach et al., 2020).

Research Method

This research method is qualitative with a phenomenological approach (Tracy, 2019). The main data source or participants are the Muslim scholar (*ulama'*) figures in the East Java region, specifically. The determination of participation in this study was carried out using a purposive technique (Kothari, 2004), in which participants were selected according to the provisions or criteria that had been made, namely *ulama'* figures, government representatives, and community leaders who experienced and knew the incidents of conflict between religious groups. Based on the field data from 8 main informants that were chosen carefully, like *ulama'* leaders, government representatives, and community leaders from the target participants of 12 people. Several participants who did not want to be interviewed were 4 people for some reason. The confidentiality of participants is part of research ethics, the identity will be declared by using initials according to the original name.

The in-depth interview technique was used to collect data in this study. The questions in the interview are open, general, and structured to reveal in-depth and important information from the study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). Researchers conducted direct interviews to obtain valid information as expected. Besides, to get good information, researchers also

provide flexibility to participants to answer freely and comfortably. The data collection stage or procedure is carried out after approval of permission to conduct interviews with each participant. After the data is obtained, the transcript stage of the words processed in the interview is continued. Then the important words are coded for analysis (Elliott, 2018).

The data reduction stage is an important part of analyzing the data obtained. Data reduction is based on the experience and knowledge of participants by classifying important and main statements (Moustakas, 1994). The essence of the description is everything that the participants experience. The important statements identified by the researcher were further grouped into central themes. These important statements and central themes are then used to create textural descriptions, namely descriptions of what the participants experienced (Miles, 1998). Then proceed with stages of describing structurally or according to the flow of the meaning of the experience of the phenomenon as a whole from the participants.

Results and Discussion

Conflict with Religious Nuances in Puger, Jember, East Java

Puger District has an area of 283.890 km with an average height of 12 m above sea level. Puger sub-district consists of 12 villages namely: Wringin Telu, Purwoharjo, Mojomulyo, Puger Kulon, Puger Wetan, Mojosari, Grenden, Kasiyan, Mlokorejo, Wonosari, Jambearum, Bagon. All villages qualify as Self-Help Villages. Puger Kulon Village is located side by side with Puger Wetan Village. This village is also located approximately 40 km from downtown Jember towards the south. The size of Puger Kulon Village is approximately 388,800m². Puger Kulon village also has rice fields with an area of 6,955m² and a field area of 21,394m². In Puger Kulon village, apart from having a coast, it also has a pond. In 2009, the total population of the village of Puger Kulon was about 6842 men, and 6856 women while the number of family heads was around 4006 families. So the overall population in Puger Kulon was around

13,698 people. The population is 13,195 with 98% Muslim and the rest being Catholic. Their livelihoods include fishermen, farmers, and entrepreneurs, and some are civil servants/military. The places of worship in this village are 7 mosques and around 40 prayer rooms. The educational facilities are 6 elementary school equivalent, 3 junior high school equivalent, and 1 vocational high school. Darus Solihin is the only Islamic boarding school in the village that is known for its rather rough character, this is influenced by the weather, which has a high level of heat, which is around 250C - 350C. This Islamic boarding school is raised by Habib Ali bin Umar Al Habsy (*Ustaz Ali*). Especially in the Mandaran 1 and Mandaran 2 hamlets, the language used can be said to be fifty-fifty between Javanese and Madurese languages, even though the culture is Madurese culture and a small part of the Indonesian language. Meanwhile, for other hamlets, the language is dominated by Javanese. The conflict between community groups in Puger which has religious teachings is not only Sunni-Shia and not a new conflict. The seeds for this problem existed since the early 1980s, even before that.

The Study of the Red Bracelet and Wahidiyah

In the early 1980s, a red bracelet recitation group appeared, which was 'labeled' as dissentient by the community. After being inactive for decades, in early 2011 this group emerged again and was forcibly closed down by the community. Although it is no longer heard of, the Red Bracelets group is still around, it's just that some of its members have moved to several villages on the outskirts of Puger. Not long after, a new conflict emerged between the community and the Wahidiyah recitation group. Because their teachings were dissentient, residents rejected the presence of this recitation group in Puger. In the middle of 2012, hundreds of Puger residents blocked and damaged the vehicle of the Wahidiyah congregation who was going to carry out recitation in Puger. Although residents reject and label her as a dissentient until now Jamaah Wahidiyah continues to carry out recitation activities even though it is carried

out covertly. A conflict wrapped in Sunni-Shia issues emerged and was reported in the media two years ago. Residents considered the recitation carried out by Habib Ali bin Umar Al-Habsyi which was considered to be vilifying the Companions of the Prophet. It is on this basis that the people claim that *Ustaz Ali's* teachings are Shia teachings. The situation heated up when dozens of people suspected of being *Ustaz Ali's* students attacked *Ustaz Fauzi*, one of the Puger community leaders. These attacks were the starting point for escalating conflicts in the name of Sunnis and Shiites. The following discussion analyses the actual background contributing to the Sunni-Shiah conflict.

Santet as Rivalry to Kyai

Conflicts between communities that are wrapped in Sunni and Shia issues are not purely a matter of differences in belief. The difference in belief is indeed one of the triggers for conflict, but not the main trigger. Two other hidden issues equally contributed to the emergence of the Sunni-Shiah conflict in Puger. Habib Ali bin Umar Al-Habsyi was not a native of Puger, he was a newcomer who opened a pesantren and taught the Koran to small children in a small mosque in front of his house in the 1980s. As time goes by, the *musholla* which was once small has now become a mosque, even the students of Habib Ali bin Umar Al-Habsyi have grown to hundreds. Even today, Darus Sholihin Islamic boarding school and several schools have been established.

The development of the Darus Sholihin Islamic Boarding School gave rise to rivalries and struggles for influence between Habib Ali bin Umar Al-Habsyi and several Kyai and religious figures who had lived longer in Puger. Unfortunately, in its development, the Darus Sholihin Islamic Boarding School was less accepted by local ulama and even positioned itself as a competitor. One example is the grand recitation of the Prophet's birthday. Even though the local ulama had held a grand recitation, the Darus Sholihin Pesantren seemed reluctant to join the existing recitation and hold a counter recitation. These conditions led to divisions in society between supporters of local ulama and

followers of *Ustaz* Ali. Apart from rivalry, other problems cause conflict. *Ustaz* Fauzi is the son of the most influential figure in Puger. When his father passed away, *Ustaz* Fauzi was called home from the pesantren where he studied by his family and the surrounding community and asked to continue his father's teaching at the Musholla next to his house. When *Ustaz* Fauzi came home, there was a rumor that *Ustaz* Fauzi was a wizard. It was not known who spread the rumors, to the point that the young *Ustaz* Fauzi was summoned by *Ustaz* Ali to clarify the accusation. Until now, *Ustaz* Fauzi's followers still think that *Ustaz* Ali is the spreader of the witchcraft rumors. On the other hand, *Ustaz* Ali's followers claimed that *Ustaz* Fauzi's followers deliberately raised the issue of witchcraft to popularize *Ustaz* Fauzi.

Sunni-Shiah Just Polishing or Not? Sunnis and Shi'ites are only packaged and cannot be used as accurate references to parse the problem in Puger. Apart from Sunnis and Shiah, other packages are often used by the media and government officials to explain community conflicts in Puger, including Wahidiyah and the Red Wristbands. These packages do not explain the real problems in society. Problem-solving that refers only to the wrapper will never solve the problem completely. In the case of conflict between Puger residents and the Darus Sholihin Islamic Boarding School, the media and government should no longer call it a conflict between Sunnis and Shiah. Because the emergence of this conflict is not solely due to differences in doctrine, several other problems are more fundamental and more complicated. Intensive communication between the two warring parties is an absolute requirement to solve the problem. The government and the MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/ Indonesian Muslim Scholars Council) should be good mediators to resolve problems, one of which is resolved by not labeling certain groups of society as "dissentient and misleading" (Hasan, 2017).

A series of Puger Sunni-Shia Conflict Events.

The tragedy of the clash in Puger, Jember on Wednesday (11/09/2013), made some people

think of the Sampang Case last year. The root of the problem in the clashes that occurred in Jember and Sampang was the resistance of the community to the sporadic Shia teachings that were shrouded in the veil of Ahlu Sunnah teachings. Especially in the Puger area, Jember Regency, cases like this often occur, but two major events have occurred to date. This conflict between the followers of *Ustaz* Ali Al Habsyi and the supporters of *Ustaz* Fauzi was concentrated in the village of Puger Kulon. *Ustaz* Fauzi lives in Mandaran 2 Hamlet and *Ustaz* Ali in Mandaran 1 Hamlet.

Case in 2012: Incidents of Pre and Post Studies' The attack issues on June 7th, 2012 were deliberately released by *Ustaz* Ali who understands Shiah, so that the recitation would fail (Ida & Saud, 2020). Given that the recitation would be attended by Habib Muhdhor bin Muhammad al-Hamid who is very vocal about the Shia group and its teachings (anti-Shia). For more details on these events, this can be seen as follows: The night of the peak of the recitation program. Before the recitation ceremony in the village of Puger Wetan, previously, Gus Yak had conveyed the request while leading a coordination meeting between PCNU Kencong and Kyai, Habib, and Puger Community Leaders at the residence of H. Arif Gerenden, Puger (01/6 /2012), which is also an official request from PCNU Kencong to the government (Anindya, 2019). There are six points of demands submitted by PCNU Kencong to the government: First, to prohibit *Ustaz* Ali Al Habsy and his group from teaching either orally, in writing, or through electronic media which contradicts the ideology of *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*. Second, the Central and Regional Governments are requested not to provide opportunities for the spread of Shia ideology in Indonesia, because this ideology whose inhabitants believe in that *Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah* has a very high chance of creating instability that can threaten the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.

Third, the Central and Regional Governments are requested to take action on the prevailing laws and regulations, including freezing/ banning the activities of Shiah and

related institutions. Fourth, the Central and Regional Governments are requested to act decisively in handling conflicts that occur, not only at the time of their occurrence but also the factors that trigger the conflict, because the triggers of conflict are provocateurs who have committed terror and mental violence so that there must be comprehensive handling. Fifth, the central and regional governments are requested to act decisively in dealing with deviant sects because this does not include religious freedom but blasphemy. Sixth, Muslims are asked not to be easily provoked into committing acts of violence (anarchism), because this is not justified in Islam and is contrary to efforts to foster a conducive atmosphere for the smooth propagation of Islam.

Case in 2013: Incident Carnival riots. Before the bloody incident on Wednesday, September 11, 2013, there was a BAKESBANGPOL meeting on Monday, September 9, 2013, Hours: 19.00 WIB to prevent clashes from occurring for fear of triggering clashes like what happened in 2012 (Courty et al., 2019). The meeting was held by Muspida, PCNU Jember, PCNU Kencong, MUI Jember, Muspika Puger at the Aston hotel. The meeting discussed the implementation of the Carnival to be held by PP. Darus Shalihin Puger led by Ust. Ali Al-Habsyi Puger. The coordination meeting (09/09/2013) resulted in a 3-point decision, namely, first, the PP Darussholihin Carnival Plan on September 11, 2013, was not allowed to be held in Puger Kulon. Second, religious mass organization figures helped maintain the conduciveness of Puger and did not issue controversial statements, which could provoke the masses' anger. Third, if the PP Darussholihin forces their will, then blockades are carried out with barricades at the entrance to the pesantren area and sufficient troops to prevent the community.

Because of the carnival that will be held by the Darus Solihin Islamic boarding school (*Ustaz* Ali bin Umar Al Habsyi), there are indications that it will provoke the anger of the surrounding community, but Ust. Ali still held it. Even though there was an agreement like that, in the end, the bloody incident occurred because the

head of the carnival committee insisted on carrying out the carnival and called through a loudspeaker so that the police did not block the road. With this incident, the people supporting *Ustaz* Ali were provoked by the actions of the carnival committee who violated the agreement. The chronology of the rioting in the Puger District, Jember Regency, East Java, and Wednesday, September 11, 2013, will be described below. The sequence of events is based on information compiled by Tempo, including from the Puger Sector Police and The Jember Resort Police and combined with the NU On-Line Kencong Jember media (nukencong.or.id and www.nu.or.id), then beritajatim.com, tribunnews.com, antaranews.com, Radar Jember, and so on. The main triggers for social conflict as described above can be seen in Figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Social Conflict Triggers

Conflict Resolution: The Solver of Religious Problems

Conflict resolution referred to in this discussion is an effort to build new and long-lasting relationships between Muslim (Sunni-Shia) groups that have experienced conflict, namely by referring to various conflict-handling strategies. The goal is to reach an agreement to end the conflict and find a new formula because there are still differences in understanding of the sources and causes of conflict. In other words, conflict resolution is an effort to manage harmonious relations between conflicting groups. Several post-conflict Sunni-Shia conflict resolution efforts were undertaken, among others: 1) coordination meetings at the Muspida level involving various elements to reduce wider conflicts; 2) increasing the intensity of

communication between conflicting parties to anticipate provocative issues; 3) taking firm action against the perpetrators and masterminds of the riot through efforts to find, detain/arrest and punish by the prevailing laws and laws; 4) appeal to the Puger community, especially Puger Kulon village, to remain calm and patient and for the future; 5) assist victims for loss of property and life (Yonekura, 2014).

For clarity, it will be described as follows; efforts continue to be made by several parties, namely the community, village officials, mass organizations, district governments, and even the provincial level. All parties have their respective strategies for addressing the conflict. At the community level and village, officials use an inaction strategy, which is to assume that conflict never existed, so that when asked to become resource persons it is very difficult for the community and village officials to provide information regarding the conflict, they do this because the conflict that occurs is felt to be not their capacity. People whose knowledge can be said to be laymen (not particularly skilled in understanding Sunni-Shiah). This is in line with what AH said; *The people there (Mandaran I and II hamlets) are included in the lay category in terms of this conflict, so it will be difficult for you to find data there, you might even be scolded. Because everyone knows that this conflict has a Sunni-Shiite element, we are here to keep our mouths shut because those who understand such matters are the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) Puger and Jember, those who study it, we are here just to follow it... Because if a case is left to those who are not an expert, it will not solve the problem, but only add to the problem.*

The next resolution strategy, namely the district and provincial governments, has made several problem-solving efforts, namely by bringing together the two conflicting parties to discuss problems and find common ground so that the conflict does not escalate and become prolonged (Savirani, 2020). Widespread conflict is often caused by failed efforts to stop violence, or in some cases, there are indications of "omission" by state actors. When conflicts happened, it is important to solve the conflicts by doing conflict resolution, giving rights to the victims, spreading peace to both parties, or

making "peace agreements or agenda" that is done by the government first, then to the society in every level (Rahman, 2020).

This is in line with the statement of the Head of MUI Jember (Prof. KH. Abd. Halim Soebahar, MA) who agrees with the statement of Regent MZA Djalal, that peace can only be created by the Puger people themselves. *"Not by top-down, from bottom to top, from the government. Currently, society is still unstable, it cannot be forced"*. Not much different from this statement, former Chairman of the PBNU, Hasyim Muzadi, asked all parties to maintain the peace of society when taking the time to the family of the late victims of the rioting, Puger Eko Mardi Santoso; *"I hope that the riots that occurred in Puger do not happen again so that all parties must find the root of the problem to provide a solution for both parties,"*. However, the Resolution reached its breaking point, because it was also the desire of many parties that the Puger conflict is resolved quickly. Namely on Wednesday (18/09/2013). Two elite groups in Puger Kulon Village, Puger Jember Subdistrict, East Java agreed to hold a "ceasefire".

The agreement occurred during the initial mediation of the peace effort in Puger which was held in the UPTD Puger Education Hall. Two camps in conflict, Habib Ali bin Umar Al Habsyi, the leader of the Darus Sholihin Islamic Boarding School, and *Ustaz* Ahmad Fauzi Syamsul Hadi agreed to make peace. The peace agreement was witnessed by the Regent of Jember MZA Djalal, the leadership of the Jember Resort Police, and the 0824 Military District Command. This mediation was the starting point for the reconciliation of the two groups. The results of the mediation are stated in the agreement on a piece of stamped paper. The peace agreement was represented by their respective elites, mediated by the Regent of Jember, MZA. Djalal. The place where the peace agreement took place was in the Hall of the Technical Implementation Unit of the Puger Education Office. They agreed that the tragedy of the Puger conflict would not be repeated and they promised to forget the conflict and maintain peace, security, and order.

According to MZA. Djalal, the peace

agreement between the two camps is an initial peace and needs to be continually endeavored to become a permanent peace. To several media, Djalal revealed *in the next month, that the two camps also agreed not to carry out activities involving the masses, not provoking each other, and not involving other people or parties from outside Puger.* There are five important points in the agreement to make peace together. First, both parties are aware of and expressed concern over the conflict that occurred on Wednesday (11/9/2013) which resulted in damage to housing facilities and infrastructure, worship, educational institutions, fishing boats, injured victims, to the loss of human life, namely EMS. Second, the parties want peace, security, and order for the sake of realizing public welfare. Third, while waiting for the permanent peace efforts made by the Regent of Jember in particular months, both parties promised not to carry out mass mobilization activities, hold *kirab* (Islamic Carnival), general carnival, and any mass activities on roads and public facilities, until the social situation is orderly, safe, and in control. The two parties will also not provoke, slander, intimidate and attack each other, physically or non-physically, from one party to another. The two parties will also not involve other people/parties outside Puger District for conflict resolution without the approval of the Jember Regent. Finally, both parties agree on law enforcement and if within one month it is deemed that no permanent peace has been realized, there will be an evaluation. Both parties are obliged to disseminate the agreement to their respective congregations.

Therefore, amid efforts toward a permanent peace, it is hoped that both parties will not mobilize masses, and do not hold *kirab*, carnival, or mass activities on roads and public facilities. There is no provocation, slander, intimidation, and attacking each other physically or non-physically. For the realization of the peace agreement, Habib Isa Mahdi Al Habsy, who represented the Darussolihin Islamic Boarding School camp, said he was very grateful for the peace agreement. Meanwhile, the other camp represented by Ustaz Fauzi guaranteed that all his followers would hold the peace agreement.

“Yes, we want all conflicts to be ended and ready to follow all the points of the agreement,” After signing the peace agreement, Habib Isa and Fauzi embraced in the presence of the Jember Muspida officials and Muspika Puger.

Conclusion

The conflict that happens in Puger which deals with religious teachings is not only a Sunni-Shia conflict, and it is not a new conflict. The seeds for this kind of problem existed since the early 1980s, even long before that. The conflict between the followers of Habib Ali Al Habsyi and supporters of *Ustaz* Fauzi was concentrated in the village of Puger Kulon. *Ustaz* Fauzi lives in Mandaran 2 Hamlet and *Ustaz* Ali in Mandaran 1 Hamlet.

Several factors caused the riots in Puger which were interrelated, and did not stand alone, first was the dispute between the two groups of *Ustaz* Ali and *Ustaz* Fauzi which had different religious views, and had been going on for a long time. Secondly, organizing a carnival that is not permitted by the police, has resulted in criminal acts of destruction and maltreatment. Third, there is a provocation possibility from outside parties, and fourth, due to the existence of Shiah ideology and teachings, these teachings have the potential to cause friction and unrest in the community in Puger sub-district, especially in Puger Kulon village and its surroundings as the ideologies and teachings spread by *Ustaz* Ali.

Several post-conflict Sunni-Shia conflict resolution efforts were undertaken, are: 1) coordination meetings at the Regional Leadership Conference level by involving various elements to reduce the wider conflict; 2) increasing the intensity of communication between ethnic groups and religious ideologies to anticipate provocative issues; 3) taking determine action against perpetrators and masterminds of the riot through efforts to find, detain/ arrest, and punish by the prevailing laws; 4) appealing to the Puger community, especially Puger Kulon village, to remain calm and patient; 5) assisting victims for property and life loss.

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